
“Why invest in light rail when we could just improve Canberra’s buses instead?”
It’s a fair question. Buses are familiar, flexible and already the backbone of Canberra’s public transport network. Light rail, by contrast, is disruptive to build and has attracted its share of political debate. For a Canberran trying to make sense of the argument, scepticism about light rail investment is understandable.
This entry in PTCBR’s Light Rail Mythbusters series takes this question seriously. It examines the case for a bus-based alternative by looking at what bus rapid transit genuinely requires in practice, how it compares to light rail across a range of criteria, and why Canberra’s specific planning context and corridor constraints preclude certain options.
In researching this article, we’ve drawn on published planning documents from the ACT Government and elsewhere, international transport research, and Australian infrastructure cost data. The article is specifically concerned with the case for high-capacity public transport along Canberra’s key corridors, and is organised around the following three questions:
- Why does Canberra need higher-capacity public transport?
- Does bus rapid transit deliver the same benefits as light rail?
- Is bus rapid transit easier and cheaper to deliver than light rail?
Bus rapid transit (BRT) might be the right fit for some cities – there are many examples of great BRT systems around of the world. However, in the specific case of Canberra and the somewhat unique regulatory constraints arising from its national capital status, there is only one feasible solution to our long-term high-capacity public transport needs.
The claim: Canberra could get the same public transport outcomes as light rail by investing in bus rapid transit instead.
The reality: When compared on a like-for-like basis, bus rapid transit costs as much as light rail to build, carries fewer passengers, generates weaker housing outcomes and cannot be delivered in Canberra’s current regulatory environment.
Question #1: Why does Canberra need higher-capacity public transport?
Canberra is in the midst of a sustained population boom. Between 2011 and 2021, the nation’s capital grew by 100,000 residents, with another 100,000 expected within the next decade. This rapid growth presents a fundamental choice: either we invest proactively in a public transport system that can support a growing, accessible city, or accept a future of worsening traffic congestion and declining livability – an option that carries serious long-term costs of its own.
The coverage vs. patronage dilemma
The transport challenges created by this growth is one that Canberra’s bus network has long struggled to resolve. This is because our network is essentially pulled in two competing directions. On one hand, we want it to provide broad coverage, with the goal of having 95 per cent of all households within 500 metres of a bus stop. On the other hand, we want it to deliver high-patronage services that are frequent, direct and reliable. Both goals are explicitly outlined in the ACT Government’s 2012 Transport for Canberra policy and illustrated in Figure 1.

In a geographically dispersed city like Canberra, these two goals are in direct and constant competition. With a finite number of buses and drivers, every vehicle assigned to a low-density coverage route in the suburbs is a vehicle unavailable to increase frequency on a major arterial route. This is the central, inescapable tension of a bus-only system in a city structured like ours.
Simply adding more buses does little to resolve this structural tension. So long as Canberra continues to grow, any additional buses are immediately absorbed into the same trade-off. This dilemma has been a recurring challenge for Canberra’s public transport agencies for over forty years.
How Canberra’s planning policy shapes public transport demand
Canberra’s growth challenge is shaped by the deliberate planning choices that determine where new housing should be built. The sprawling “Satellite Town” model of the Y–Plan era (1970–1988) was officially abandoned in the 1990s on economic and environmental grounds. Since then, successive ACT Governments have pursued a policy of accommodating the majority of Canberra’s future housing growth within the existing urban footprint, with stronger concentrations in the city centre, town centres and along key transport corridors.
This policy was formalised in the 2004 Canberra Spatial Plan, which explicitly targeted transport corridors like Northbourne Avenue for redevelopment. It was strengthened in the 2012 ACT Planning Strategy, which aimed to deliver 50 per cent of new housing in these “urban intensification localities”, and reinforced again in the 2018 Planning Strategy, which set a target of 70 per cent of all new housing as infill along these same corridors. In April 2025, the ACT Legislative Assembly went further still, agreeing to establish a hard urban growth boundary by mid-2027.



Locating new housing close to jobs, amenities, and public transport makes excellent planning sense. It makes better use of existing suburban infrastructure, costs the government significantly less than equivalent housing in greenfield estates, destroys less environmentally sensitive land on the urban periphery, and reduces the need for new bus routes to serve low-density, outlying areas.
However, this approach also concentrates public transport demand on a small number of corridors. As tens of thousands of new residents move into these areas, the bus network faces the increasingly difficult task of preventing major corridors from becoming chronically congested, while still providing reasonable coverage across the wider city.
The “trunk and feeder” solution
The most effective way to reduce pressure on these major corridors is to increase the capacity of the public transport services running along them. As seen with Canberra’s Rapid bus network, the logical first step is to run more frequent, direct bus services. These are the network’s high-patronage routes, carrying large numbers of people between key destinations along “trunk” corridors and connecting with the lower frequency coverage routes at dedicated interchanges.
At this point, a reasonable question arises: why do buses need to finish their route at the interchanges? Why not simply have all the coverage buses continue from the suburban street straight through the interchange and along the trunk corridor to the city centre, giving passengers a direct, single-seat journey?
This “through-running” model is used in many cities and has intuitive appeal. The problem is that it contains a hidden cost that is felt across the entire network, as detailed by Infrastructure Australia’s 2018 analysis of outer urban public transport.
As shown in Figure 2, in an “unconsolidated” network scenario where individual buses travel from suburban streets all the way along the trunk through to the city centre, multiple buses end up sharing the same corridor for much of their journey. Because each bus is committed to the entire journey, it is unavailable for other services, thereby reducing frequencies across the entire network.
This approach also creates reliability problems. When a bus delayed in the suburbs arrives late at the trunk corridor, that delay ripples through every stop along the rest of its route and the next service it is scheduled to run. A local example is the Rapid 2 bus, which has the dubious honour of being one of Canberra’s longest and least punctual bus routes.

However: when a network is reorganised so that shorter bus routes connect to a trunk service at key interchanges, the number of services per hour more than doubles, despite the total vehicle kilometres travelled remaining the same. In this “integrated” network, a delay on a suburban route affects that bus, but does not cascade across the whole network. The result is a more resilient and efficient public transport system that provides better services to more people.
In a city like Canberra, with clearly defined public transport corridors that have been baked into its urban fabric for over a century, this integrated trunk and feeder approach is the logical framework for dealing with its long term transport challenges. Separating the coverage bus routes from the busy trunk corridors enables more frequent services to be provided right across the city, so even if you don’t live right next to the trunk corridor, you’ll still get a better bus service overall.
The transfer question
While the trunk-and-feeder model produces better network outcomes, it is worth acknowledging that people dislike transferring, and a requirement to change vehicles can be a deterrent to using public transport at all.
However, the severity of this “transfer penalty” is heavily dependent on the quality of the connection between services. Canberra's own experience of the “trunk and feeder” model deployed to great effect in the 1970s and 80s shows that passengers are willing to transfer when connections are reliable and undertaken at dedicated interchanges.
Overall, requiring some transfers is a manageable trade-off that allows a city to deliver a more frequent, reliable and scalable public transport network.
It goes without saying that buses are the best mode for providing coverage services. Their flexibility allows them to navigate residential streets across a broad geographic area without the need for fixed infrastructure. As an interim measure, buses would also be suitable for operating the trunk corridors, as is currently the case with Canberra’s Rapid bus network.
This leads to another obvious question: if Canberra needs to increase capacity on its trunk public transport corridors, why not do so using a bus rapid transit system?
Question #2: Does bus rapid transit deliver the same benefits as light rail?
Firstly – what is BRT? It’s a system of vehicles and infrastructure designed to enable fast, high-capacity travel by bus. While there is no single legal definition that distinguishes BRT from a regular bus route, a useful tool for assessing BRT quality is the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy’s BRT Standard. This standard identifies five core elements that a bus system needs to qualify as genuine BRT. These elements are reproduced in Table 1 below.
| TABLE 1 | |
|---|---|
| BRT feature | Description |
| Dedicated right-of-way | Bus-only lanes make for faster travel and ensure that buses are never delayed due to mixed traffic congestion. |
| Busway Alignment | A centre-of-roadway or bus-only corridor keeps buses away from the busy kerbside where cars are parking, standing, and turning. |
| Off-board fare collection | Fare payment at the station, instead of on the bus, eliminates the delay caused by passengers waiting to pay on board. |
| Intersection Treatments | Prohibiting turns for traffic across the bus lane reduces delays caused to buses by turning traffic. Prohibiting such turns is the most important measure for moving buses through intersections – more important even than signal priority. |
| Platform-level boarding | The station should be at level with the bus for quick and easy boarding. This also makes it fully accessible for wheelchairs, disabled passengers, strollers and carts with minimal delays. |
These features are all found in Canberra’s light rail system. For BRT to serve as a genuine like-for-like alternative, it would need these same characteristics. Notably, an early study comparing the costs of BRT and light rail in Canberra assumed that no new buses would need to be purchased and no depots constructed! A meaningful comparison must be based on what a complete, operational system actually requires.
Throughput, scalability and long-term operating costs
The most significant practical difference between light rail and BRT begins with vehicle capacity. As shown in Table 2, a standard 5-car light rail vehicle (LRV), like those currently operating in Canberra, can carry up to 276 passengers. This is more than double the capacity of an articulated bus, and considerably more than even the largest bi-articulated buses, such as those used in the Brisbane Metro. A longer 7-car LRV, as used in Sydney’s Parramatta Light Rail, can carry up to 425 passengers – a capacity larger than any tyre-based vehicle (Canberra’s light rail network is future-proofed for LRVs of this size).
| TABLE 2 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Vehicle type | Passenger capacity (seated + standing) | Number of vehicles and drivers required per hour for 5,000 pphpd* |
| Standard bus | 60-71 | 71-84 |
| Articulated bus | 107-109 | 46-47 |
| Bi-articulated bus | 150-170 | 30-34 |
| 5-car LRV | 207-276 | 19-25 |
| 7-car LRV | 400-425 | 12-13 |
This difference in vehicle capacity is critical. To move equivalent numbers of people on a high-demand corridor, BRT requires substantially more vehicle movements. At high frequencies, this can lead to the phenomenon of “bus bunching”, even within dedicated busways, such as those in Brisbane. Light rail, by contrast, can move the same number of people with far fewer, larger vehicles, producing a more consistent and reliable service.
Any honest assessment of cost needs to account for operating costs, noting that the largest ongoing expense in any public transport system in a high-income city like Canberra is labour. One LRV with one driver can carry the passenger load of two or three articulated buses. As Table 2 illustrates, moving 5,000 passengers per hour with light rail requires substantially fewer drivers than even a bi-articulated bus system.
By choosing BRT for a high-demand corridor, a city locks itself into perpetually higher operating costs that grow as wages rise and patronage increases. Light rail’s higher capital cost effectively “buys down” this ongoing operating liability, making it a more fiscally sustainable choice over the life of the system.
The relevant comparison, therefore, is not upfront cost alone, but rather the whole-of-life cost across decades of operation.
Passenger preference and patronage
Building a technically efficient public transport system is only part of the challenge. To address car dependency in a city like Canberra, the system must also attract people who currently choose to drive. Passenger preference research consistently identifies a meaningful preference for rail over buses, even where service characteristics like travel time and cost are similar.
Light rail is widely perceived as more modern, comfortable and reliable than bus services. The smooth, quiet ride of steel wheels on steel rail is qualitatively different from the vibration and movement of a bus. The open, spacious interior of an LRV feels different from a diesel or even an electric bus interior, particularly during peak crowding.
This preference translates into real-world patronage. New light rail systems consistently attract more passengers than equivalent bus services and frequently exceed initial forecasts. Canberra’s own Stage 1 network exceeded its patronage projections and required additional services to be introduced to meet demand. A remarkable 43 per cent of Canberra’s light rail passengers weren’t frequent users of public transport before the line opened, demonstrating that light rail can and does attract a cohort of new passengers who wouldn’t travel on a bus.
Some analyses suggest that BRT can match light rail in ridership when service quality and vehicle standards are identical. In practice, the mode itself influences the very attributes that shape passenger perception, with vehicle capacity, perceived reliability and ride comfort all being areas where rail holds an inherent advantage.
To successfully attract a significant number of new passengers in Canberra, the system must be not only fast and frequent, but genuinely attractive as a mode of transport. On this front, light rail has a proven track record.
The risk of service dilution
There is a structural vulnerability in BRT projects that deserves careful attention. This is the tendency for the essential features of a high-quality BRT system to be progressively stripped away over time, in response to cost pressures and political compromise – a phenomenon documented often enough to have earned a specific name: “BRT creep”.
Because BRT projects are typically justified on the basis that they cost less than rail-based alternatives, a cost-cutting mindset is present from the outset. Once some compromises are accepted – for example, shared lanes instead of dedicated ones, basic bus stops instead of proper stations, or on-board fare payment instead of off-board – it becomes easier to accept further compromises down the line. The result is a system that is slower, less reliable, less attractive to passengers and less effective as a driver of development than originally promised.
Light rail, by virtue of its fixed infrastructure, is substantially more resistant (albeit not immune) to this dilution. The tracks, stations and operational requirements of the system make it considerably harder to quietly downgrade. This durability is part of what makes rail a credible long-term investment. A BRT system, even one designed with the best intentions, requires sustained political commitment over decades to maintain the features that make it effective.
Light rail as a housing catalyst
As outlined earlier, Canberra’s planning strategy requires most new housing to be delivered along key transport corridors. Achieving this goal depends on attracting large-scale private investment in high-quality transport-oriented development (TOD). The choice between light rail and BRT has a direct bearing on whether that investment materialises.
The physical permanence of steel tracks provides a level of investment certainty that bus-based systems struggle to match. Recent analysis of land values within Canberra’s existing light rail corridor found them to be between 10 and 25 per cent higher than the city-wide average, consistent with outcomes observed in the Gold Coast and Sydney.
This premium is a demonstration of the signal that fixed rail infrastructure sends to the market: a multi-generational government commitment that is politically and financially difficult to reverse. Homeowners and investors making similar long-term financial commitments understand that a rail line represents durable, long-term amenity in a way that a bus route does not.
The development impact of BRT, by comparison, is more conditional. Some studies show modest land value increases near well-designed BRT stations, but this effect is heavily dependent on the system closely mimicking rail, with permanent-looking stations, fully segregated rights-of-way, and a track record of high quality service. Where these features are absent, so is the new housing.
The core reason for this difference is the perception of permanence. As we’ve already discussed, a bus route, even one with special branding and dedicated lanes, can by its very nature be altered, rerouted, or have its priority features downgraded far more easily than a rail line. This inherent flexibility, often cited as an advantage of BRT, is a liability from a long-term investment standpoint.
For Canberra, this matters directly. To attract the private investment required to meet its TOD housing targets, the strongest possible signal must be sent to the market. Light rail provides this bold and unambiguous signal, whereas BRT, with its greater susceptibility to service dilution, sends a weaker message.
The environmental case
Another dimension that merits discussion is environmental impact. Both light rail and Canberra’s electric buses, which make up an increasing proportion of the bus fleet, run on 100% renewable energy. However, direct emissions are only a small part of the equation. The environmental impact of transport is predominantly a function of the urban form that transport system enables.
Global research shows that cities which build housing close to frequent, high-quality public transport generate substantially lower transport emissions per capita compared to ones where car travel is the only practical option for most trips. The future Canberra being shaped by light rail produces long-term emissions reductions that extend well beyond the motive power of the vehicles themselves.
The environmental benefits are not the primary case for light rail – the capacity, economic and network design arguments stand independently. But for a city with Canberra’s ambitious climate commitments and housing strategy, the environmental case falls firmly on the side of light rail.
Where BRT works well
It is important to emphasise that BRT is a great solution for some cities and contexts. In places with different planning environments and corridor demands that do not justify the capital investment of rail, BRT can be an appropriate and effective choice.
The argument being presented in this piece is not that BRT is a lesser option, but that it is not as suited as light rail to the specific demands of Canberra’s major trunk corridors given their long-term capacity requirements, their role in meeting the city’s housing needs, and the regulatory and physical constraints discussed in the next section.
In Canberra’s broader transport network, bus services remain essential. The question is not whether buses have a role – they do. The question is whether a bus-based system is the right choice for the specific function of a high-capacity public transport system running along our city’s busiest corridors.
To help answer that question, we need to examine the relative costs of the two systems on a level playing field.
Question #3: Is bus rapid transit easier and cheaper to deliver than light rail?
The most persistent concern about light rail is about cost. This is a legitimate point and no serious analysis of light rail should dismiss it out of hand. However, we need to make sure we’re asking the right question when it comes to cost comparison – truly comparing apples with apples. We need to ask whether a genuine BRT alternative that provides comparable performance to light rail is materially cheaper.
The true infrastructure cost of BRT
The argument that “BRT is cheaper” often relies on comparing a full-featured light rail system to a standard bus service, which is not a useful comparison for making a proper infrastructure decision. When these features are included in the cost comparison, the gap between BRT and light rail narrows considerably.
Constructing a BRT system that delivers genuinely rail-like performance takes much more than painting new lines on an existing road. It requires substantial new infrastructure, including a dedicated right-of-way, high-quality stations, and complex intersection treatments to ensure priority over other vehicles. These are the same core elements required by light rail, minus the rail.
Examining the Brisbane Metro
The Brisbane Metro is the most serious attempt in Australia to deliver a bus-based high-capacity public transport system capable of matching rail performance. It also illustrates what genuine BRT investment requires.
Originally conceived as a cheaper alternative to a $1.54 billion rail project, the Brisbane Metro’s budget escalated from an initial estimate of $944 million to $1.55 billion, or $73.8 million per kilometre. Notably, this figure does not include the existing busway infrastructure that the Brisbane Metro vehicles depend on due to their 39-tonne gross vehicle mass.
As shown in Tables 3 and 4, when the cost of the underlying busway infrastructure is included, the true cost of the Brisbane Metro rises to $192 million per-kilometre.
| TABLE 3 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cost (2025 dollars) | South-East Busway (16.3km) | Inner Northern Busway (5.25km) | Boggo Road / Eastern Busway Stage 1 (2.1km) | Total (23.65km) |
| Total (millions) | $1,147 | Stage 1 (Roma St to Herston, 2.8km): $238 Stage 2 (Queen St to Roma St, 1.25km): $540 Stage 3 (Herston to Royal Brisbane & Women’s Hospital, 1.2km): $321 | $559* | $2,805 |
| Per kilometre (millions) | $70.4 | $209.3 | $266.2 | $118.6 |
| TABLE 4 | |
|---|---|
| Cost (2025 dollars) | Brisbane Metro Stage 1 (21km) |
| Total (millions) | $1,550 |
| Per kilometre (millions) | $73.8 |
| Per kilometre including busway infrastructure (millions) | $192 |
For context, the average construction cost across nine recent Australian light rail projects, ranging from straightforward to highly complex urban environments, is $180 million per kilometre in 2025 dollars. These figures are shown in Table 5.
| TABLE 5 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Light rail project | Total cost (millions, 2025 dollars) | Per kilometre cost (millions, 2025 dollars) |
| Canberra Stage 1 (12km) | $836 | $69.6 |
| Canberra Stage 2A (1.7km) | $579 | $340.6 |
| Gold Coast Stage 1 (13km) | $1,613 | $124 |
| Gold Coast Stage 2 (7.3km) | $539 | $73.8 |
| Gold Coast Stage 3 (6.7km) | $1,549 | $231.2 |
| Sydney Inner West (5.6km) | $237 | $42.3 |
| Sydney CBD and South East (12km) | $3,808 | $317.3 |
| Newcastle (2.7km) | $472 | $174.8 |
| Parramatta Stage 1 (12km) | $2,956 | $246.3 |
| Average | – | $180 |
The Brisbane Metro shows that when a city commits to delivering a BRT system capable of matching rail performance, it faces an infrastructure bill comparable to rail without necessarily securing all of rail’s benefits in terms of capacity, housing stimulus and operational efficiency.
This is not a criticism of Brisbane’s choices, which were made in a specific city with specific existing infrastructure. Others have discussed the merits of the Brisbane Metro within these constraints. What these figures show is what serious BRT investment actually costs, and how it stacks up against the light rail projects it is often positioned against.
Why short project segments cost more
The per-kilometre cost of Brisbane’s Eastern Busway and Canberra’s Light Rail Stage 2A are notably higher than the other projects in their respective tables. Very short segments in complex locations such as these typically show elevated per-kilometre costs because the high fixed costs of major works, including utility relocations and site establishment, are spread across a short distance. These projects are outliers, but have been included here to illustrate the full spectrum of costs associated with the two transport modes.
Lessons for Canberra
Setting aside the broader cost comparison, there are specific structural and regulatory constraints in Canberra that significantly limit what a bus-based trunk public transport system could achieve in practice.
As previously discussed, the central requirement for any effective trunk public transport corridor, whether rail or bus-based, is a dedicated right-of-way, free from interference by general traffic. This is where the hypothetical case for BRT as an alternative to Canberra’s Light Rail Stage 2 encounters real-world regulatory constraints.
The National Capital Authority (NCA), as the federal body responsible for planning and heritage in Canberra’s Central National Area, has consistently opposed any permanent repurposing of existing road space along Commonwealth Avenue for exclusive use by public transport. This hurdle has been acknowledged even by those in the ACT Legislative Assembly who have argued most strongly for a bus-based alternative to light rail.
The NCA’s other mandatory design requirements for Commonwealth Avenue include:
- an irrigated grass median with large canopy trees
- no median safety barriers, and
- retention of the existing landscaped verges.
A light rail system can meet these requirements, as illustrated by the Commonwealth Avenue Landscape Structure Plan and the Light Rail Commonwealth Avenue Masterplan. A BRT system, with its lanes of reinforced pavement, could only comply if it operated without a dedicated right-of-way, or within a fully tunnelled environment at considerably greater cost.
There are also structural constraints. Key bridges along Adelaide Avenue and Capital Circle have load limits of 32 and 32.5 tonnes respectively. The bi-articulated buses required for high-capacity BRT, such as those used by the Brisbane Metro, have a gross vehicle mass of 39 tonnes. Using these vehicles on this corridor would require the full reconstruction of multiple bridges in the vein of the current Commonwealth Avenue Bridge upgrades, adding substantial cost, complexity and disruption – or construction of a new bridge entirely, as will be done for light rail to Woden.
The ACT Government’s own expert analysis has already addressed this question. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Light Rail Stage 2B did examine a bus-based alternative to the project and concluded that modest bus upgrades, of the kind that would meet the NCA’s requirements, would not meet the future capacity and reliability needs of the corridor. It found that only light rail, being “wholly separated from an increasingly congested future road network” could deliver the necessary long-term benefits.
Taken together, these constraints fundamentally alter the value proposition of BRT in the Canberra context. A fully featured system of the kind currently operating in Brisbane is, for better or worse, unable to be delivered along our city’s busiest trunk public transport corridor. The real choice is between light rail and a bus-based alternative without the dedicated infrastructure needed to meet our city’s long-term transport needs.
What about the disruption?
The question of disruption is topical and also worth addressing. Building light rail is disruptive, but so is building comparable BRT infrastructure. The relevant comparison is not between disruption and no disruption, but between temporary disruption and the long-term consequences of underinvesting in the infrastructure a growing city needs. The most appropriate way to assess infrastructure is over the decades it operates, rather than the years it takes to build.
Building a system fit for Canberra’s future
In this article we’ve strived to show that the question of a “cheaper” alternative to light rail is much more complicated than it appears. A bus service that lacks dedicated infrastructure cannot adequately perform the role of a high-capacity public transport corridor, while a proper BRT system with all the bells and whistles requires investment comparable to light rail despite carrying fewer people and generating weaker development outcomes. It also cannot be meaningfully delivered in a form that meets the specific physical and regulatory requirements of Canberra’s Central National Area.
This analysis points to three main conclusions:
- On a high-demand corridor, the performance characteristics of light rail – higher vehicle capacity, lower long-term operating costs, better housing outcomes and greater passenger appeal – align with what Canberra’s high-capacity public transport corridors need to deliver.
- The apparent cost advantage of BRT largely disappears when the comparison is made on a like-for-like basis. A genuine high-capacity BRT system requires rail-comparable investment, and over the whole life of the system, light rail is a more fiscally sustainable choice.
- Along Canberra’s busiest public transport corridor, the structural and regulatory and constraints imposed by the National Capital Authority make a high-performance BRT system incredibly difficult to deliver in a cost-effective manner.
None of this is an argument against buses, which will always be the workhorse of Canberra’s public transport system. The trunk and feeder network approach delivers a future where light rail handles the high-volume corridors, leaving buses free to deliver more frequent and reliable services across the rest of the city.
Ultimately, the decisions Canberra makes regarding its transport infrastructure will shape its pattern of growth and the quality of its public transport for generations to come. Building a system where each mode performs the role it is best suited to is the most coherent path toward a city that is accessible, liveable and well placed to manage that continued growth.
This is the approach that PTCBR has always supported, and is the case we will continue to make.
•••
Coming up next in PTCBR’s Mythbusters series: The Northbourne Housing Hoax – how light rail funded new public housing.